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Comment
The Lemon Test and Subjective Intent
in Establishment Clause Analysis: The

Case for Abandoning the Purpose
Prong
INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding public school instruction on the
origin of life has found its way into the court system of the
United States once again.' In Edwards v. Aguillard,2 the United

States Supreme Court recently invalidated a Louisiana statute3
which required "balanced treatment '

4

of "creation science" 5

and "evolution science' '6in lectures and textbook materials used
I The field remains ripe for further litigation. Between the years 1968 and 1983,
"balanced treatment" statutes, see, e.g., infra note 6, were "introduced in at least
fifteen states, including ... Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Texas." Wood, Religion and the Public Schools, 1986 B.Y.U. L. RPv. 349, 357
(citing Levit, Creationism, Evolution and the First Amendment: The Limits of Constitutionally Permissible Scientific Inquiry, 14 J.L. & EDTJC. 211, 212 (1985)).
2 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (plurality opinion).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).
"Balanced treatment" under the statute required "providing whatever information and instruction in both creation and evolution models the classroom teacher
determine[d] [was] necessary and appropriate to provide insight into both theories in
view of the textbooks and other instructional materials available for use in his classroom." Id. at § 17:286.3(1). More specifically, the Louisiana law required that "balanced
treatment" be given "in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in textbook
materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for the
science and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in
public schools." Id. at § 17:286.4(A).
I The Louisiana statute defined "[c]reation science" as "the scientific evidences
for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences." Id. at § 17:286.3(2).
6 "Evolution science" was defined by the statute as "the scientific evidences for
evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences." Id. at § 17:286.3(3).
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in public schools. The Edwards decision, however, did not clarify

the Court's position on whether it is proper under the establishment clause7 for a state to introduce "creation science" into its
public school system via statute. The difficulty lies in the Court's
use of the "purpose" prong' of the Lemon v. Kurtzman9 test in

making this determination.' 0
Application of the "purpose" prong fails to provide a
sistent standard for states to follow in adopting legislation
cerning religion, particularly the teaching of creationism
evolution in public schools. This lack of clear guidance

conconand
and

precedent encourages state legislatures to revise their legislative
histories and statutory language, and to continue to enact laws
remarkably similar to those held unconstitutional by the courts."
This Comment analyzes the practical effect application of
the "purpose" prong has had on legislation concerning religion,

particularly the teaching of creationism in public schools. Section
one

2

reviews some of the difficulties associated with the appli-

cation of the Lemon test. Problem areas include the test's historical failure to provide a standard for resolving the issue of
public school instruction on creationism, 3 the inconsistent application of the test to certain factual situations, 4 and the dif-

ficulty of using subjective motivation as a judicial standard." s
I

U.S.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....
amend. I. The Supreme Court held the establishment clause applicable to the
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Court has ruled that
the primary goal of the establishment clause is to ensure governmental neutrality toward
religion. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 745-47 (1976); Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770-71 n.28, 788 (1973).
8 See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see Roemer, 426 U.S. at 748; Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 772-73.
,o In his dissenting opinion to Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Scalia wrote that the
"purpose" prong "has no basis in the history of the [constitutional] amendment it seeks
to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results." Edwards, 107 S. Ct.
at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
1 See Comment, Evolution and Creationism in the PublicSchools, 9 J. CONTEMP.
L. 81, 89 (1983-84); infra note 33.
,2 See infra notes 18-77 and accompanying text.
,1 See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
1" See infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text,
CONST.
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Section two' 6 examines the recent Supreme Court decision in

Edwards v. Aguillard 7 and its implications for the future of
establishment clause doctrine. This Comment concludes that research and reasoning indicate a need to eliminate the "purpose"

prong from the Lemon v. Kurtzman analysis of establishment
clause cases.
I.

A.

THE TEST AND ITS APPLICATION

Failure to Resolve the Controversy

18
In 1971, the Supreme Court, via the Lemon v. Kurtzman
decision, adopted a three-prong test 9 for determining whether
legislation comports with the establishment clause. The Court

set forth the test as follows: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary -effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "2
Statutes struck down by the first prong, or "purpose" prong,

have had a tendency to reappear in slightly altered forms. In the
1968 case Epperson v. Arkansas,2' the Supreme Court invalidated an Arkansas statute? which prohibited teaching, in public
23
schools, the theory that Man evolved from other species of life.

1' See infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
11 107 S. Ct. at 2573.

1sLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
,1Id. at 612-13.
20 Id.
21 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
2 Ain. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627 to -1628 (Supp. 1985).

It shall be tinlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State,
which is supported in whole or in part from public funds derived by State
and local taxation to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended
or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall be unlawful
for any teacher, textbook commission, or other authority exercising the
power to select textbooks for above mentioned educational institutions to
adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches the doctrine
or theory that mankind descended or ascended from a lower order of
animals.
Id. at § 80-1627.
2

1064

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VoL. 76

The Court found there could be no state policy justification for

such a law "other than [a desire to support] the religious views
of some of its citizens."' 24
In 1973 the Tennessee General Assembly passed a statute
26
requiring, inter alia, that any textbook expressing an opinion
on the origin of man also give "commensurate attention" to

"other theories, including, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible." '27 Relying on both Lemon and Epperson2 5
the Sixth Circuit found that the legislative intent 29 of the Act
was to attack the theory of evolution while promoting a religious
30
doctrine in violation of the establishment clause.

2, Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107. Epperson was decided before the 1971 Lemon
decision. In Epperson, the Court applied the predecessor of the Lemon test found in
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (consisting of the first two
Lemon prongs, "purpose" and "effect," minus the third, the "entanglement" prong).
111973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 377, quoted in Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 487 (6th
Cir. 1975).
The Tennessee Act did not mandate the teaching of any theory concerning the
origins of man. Id. at § 1.
Section 1 of the statute reads in full:
Any biology textbook used for teaching in the public schools, which
expresses an opinion of, or relates a theory about origins or creation of
man and his world shall be prohibited from being used as a textbook in
such system unless it specifically states that it is a theory as to the origin
and creation of man and his world and is not represented to be scientific
fact. Any textbook so used in the public education system which expresses
an opinion or relates to a theory or theories shall give in the same textbook and under the same subject commensurate attention to, and an equal
amount of emphasis on, the origins and creation of man and his world as
the same is recorded in other theories, including, but not limited to, the
Genesis account in the Bible. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to
use of any textbook now legally in use, until the beginning of the school
year of 1975-1976; provided, however, that the textbook requirements
stated above shall in no way diminish the duty of the State Textbook
Commission to prepare a list of approved standard editions of textbooks
for use in the public schools of the state as provided in this section. Each
local school bbard may use textbooks or supplementary material as approved by the State Board of Education to carry out the provisions of this
section. The teaching of all occult or satanical beliefs of human origin is
expressly excluded from this act.
Id.
Daniel, 515 F.2d at 489-91.
"' The court found that the result of the statute was to create a "clearly defined
preferential position for the Biblical version of creation as opposed to any account of
the development of man based on scientific research and reasoning." Id. at 489-90.
10After finding the "purpose" prong violation, the Daniel court also held that
2
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In 1982 another Arkansas statute,31 similar to the earlier
Arkansas and Tennessee statutes, was invalidated in McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education.3 2 The new statute required-"balanced treatment" of "creation-science" and "evolution-science"
3
in classroom lectures, textbooks, and library materials. 1
This statute represented a new method for Creationists to
attack the teaching of evolution, and to promote creationism,

by counterbalancing 34 classroom time for evolution and a newly
formulated "creation science.''

3

Judge Overton, however, found

the Act violated the "effect" and the "entanglement" prongs. Id. at 491. The Supreme
Court, however, has not followed this procedure in applying the Lemon test. If an act
is found to violate the "purpose" prong, the Court will invalidate the legislation without
applying the second or third prongs. See infra note 104.
11ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to -1670 (Supp. 1985).
32 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
33 Public Schools within this State shall give balanced treatment to
creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment to these two
[2]models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each
course, in textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library
materials taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the
humanities, and in other education programs in public schools, to the
extent that such lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the
earth, or the universe.
ARK.STAT. ANN. at § 80-1663. In an attempt to circumvent the "purpose" prong, the
Arkansas legislature expressly incorporated a secular purpose into the statute:
This Legislature enacts this Act for public schools with the purpose of
protecting academic freedom for students' differing values and beliefs;
ensuring neutrality toward students' diverse religious convictions; ensuring
freedom of religious exercise for students and their parents; guaranteeing
freedom of belief and speech for students; preventing establishment of
Theologically Liberal, Humanist, Nontheist [Nonatheist], or Atheist religions; preventing discrimination against students on the basis of their
personal beliefs concerning creation and evolution; and assisting students
in their search for truth. This Legislature does not have the purpose of
causing instruction in religious concepts or making an establishment of
religion.
Id. at § 80-1668.
14 One commentator writes that after the Epperson decision, "[flundamentalists
against the teaching of evolution ... , had to find some other tactic with which to
advance their cause." The result was the "dual model" approach. "The idea was simple
enough. If evolution could not be eliminated, perhaps it could at least be balanced with
a 'creationist' account of the origins of man and earth." Comment, supra note 11, at
93.
IsThe "creation science" terminology used in the "balanced treatment" statutes
of the 1970s and the 1980s first developed out of the publication, The Genesis Flood.
J. WmTcomB & H. MoRss, Tim GaNEsms FLOOD (1964); see Comment, supra note 11,
at 93 n.52. The Arkansas statute made no reference to Genesis.
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that the drafters of the model statute 6 (upon which the Arkansas
bill was based) and the bill's sponsors were motivated by the
same religious intent evident in the previously invalidated Arkansas and Tennessee statutes. 37 The judge also found that Genesis was the unmentioned reference for the statutory description

of "creation science. "38
Arkansas, after two failed attempts, apparently has not surrendered the battle for a "balanced treatment" statute. After
the McLean decision, Arkansas' Attorney General stated that he
would not appeal the ruling because he believed another bill
39
could be drafted that met constitutional standards.
The Attorney General's statement underscores the problem
associated with using the "purpose" prong to invalidate legislation. Suppose the sponsors of the invalidated 1982 Arkansas
statute were to introduce a new bill with exactly the same statutory language, but without reference to any model statute or
without reference to any of the other religious bases upon which
the court relied in McLean. Would the new legislation be valid
under the "purpose" prong? What if the sponsor were an atheist? In such a case, would an atheist-sponsored bill pass the
"purpose" prong because of its sponsor's nonreligious mind-set,
but the same statute with a religiously-oriented sponsor fail?
Given the above, one must question the relevancy of the inquiry
in the first place. The application of the test raises more questions than it answers and reflects the difficulty or the impossibility of determining the true motivation behind the introduction
of a bill. 40 Clearly, the use of the "purpose" prong in striking

36 Several creationist organizations have drafted bills such as the one introduced
in Arkansas. For a brief description of the approach of one of these organizations, see
McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261; see infra note 58 (for information regarding other
creationist organizations).
37McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264.
11"Among the many creation epics in human history, the account of sudden
creation from nothing, or creatio ex nihilo, and subsequent destruction of the world by
flood is unique to Genesis." Id. at 1265.
11Comment, supra note 11, at 84 n.22.
40 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("discerning the subjective motivation ... is, to be honest, almost always an impossible
task"); see also Note, Judicial Clairvoyance and the First Amendment: The Role of
Motivation in JudicialReview of Book Banning in the Public Schools, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REv. 731, 733-34 (describing former Chief Justice Warren's reasons for rejecting a
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down statutes has not settled the issue of whether "creation
41
science" may be taught in public schools.
B. Inconsistent Application and Results
The Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the "purpose" prong, and the Lemon test in general, have led to inconsistent results that confuse state legislatures and lower courts
attempting to decipher the Supreme Court cases. 42 In 1980 the
Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky statute43 which required
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. 44 Finding that the Ten Commandments, and the statute
itself, were "plainly religious in nature," 45 the Court applied a
"pre-eminent purpose" test which some commentators consider
4
to be a modification of the original "purpose" prong test. 6
47
As a result of the Court's decisions in Marsh v. Chambers
and Lynch v. Donnelly,48 the continued validity of the Lemon

judicial standard based on individual and collective motive in U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1967), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968)).
41 As recently as 1987, a "balanced treatment" statute came before the Supreme
Court in Edwards.
42 See id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our cases interpreting and applying the
purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most
conscientious government officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional."); see also Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prr. L. R~v. 83, 133-34 (1986) ("standard is incoherent"); Note, Wallace
v. Jaffree: The Lemon Test Sweetened, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1273, 1285 n.103 (1985)
("Needless to say, a test which cannot be applied in a uniform manner is unlikely to
yield uniform results."); Note, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New
Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1195-1201 (1984) [hereinafter
The Lemon Test Soured].
" Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
The Supreme Court rejected the legislature's secular avowal that the Ten Commandments were an historical reference to a basis of the Western legal system. Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981). The Court has'
taken historical reference into account in other establishment clause cases, however. See,
e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
,6 See Valauri, supra note 42, at 133.
,1 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
"' 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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test was questioned.4 9 In Marsh, the Court upheld the act of
50
opening sessions of the Nebraska State Legislature with a prayer.
In doing so, the Court carved out an exception to the Lemon
test 5' by ruling that long-standing traditions which have become
"part of the fabric of our society ' 52 do not violate the estab53
lishment clause.

In Lynch, public funding of a nativity scene by the City of
Pawtucket was upheld as valid under the establishment clause.5 4
Liberally applying the Lemon test, the Court stated it would not
"be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive

area." '5 5 The Court found a secular purpose in that the nativity
6
scene represented the historical origins of a national holiday.The Court's decisions in Marsh and in Lynch led some com-

57
mentators to believe that the Lemon test had been overruled.

Later cases, however, indicated that this was not true.

In the 1985 case of Wallace v. Jaffree58 the Court strictly
applied the Lemon test, and the "purpose" prong in particular,
in striking down an Alabama statute 9 which provided for a

minute of meditation or prayer during class time in public
schools.60 The Wallace Court reaffirmed the validity of the Lemon

49 See Note, Prayingfor Direction: The Establishment Clause and the
Supreme
Court, 10 NovA L.J. 217, 224 (1985); The Lemon Test Soured, supra note 42, at 1195
("In Marsh and Lynch the Court moved away from a rigorous application of the Lemon
analysis and toward a standard that the Court grounded in ambiguous historical references and a blanket recognition of religion in American society.").
o Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
" Justice Brennan, in dissent, wrote that had the Lemon test been applied, the
facts in Marsh would clearly violate it. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12Id. at 792.
53 Id.
-1 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681.
11Id. at 679.
36 Id. at 680.
57 See Note; supra note 47, at 225.
-1 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
19 ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in
all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is
held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in
duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during
any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
Id.
, Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-53 (The Court held that a governmental intent to
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test without overruling the seemingly inconsistent prior decisions.61 This decision further fueled the debate over the future
62
application of the test.
Recently, in Edwards v. Aguillard,63 the Court again strictly
applied the Lemon test in striking a Louisiana "balanced treatment" statute 4 The Court held that the application of the test
65
should be especially strict when public schools are involved.
The Court's selective, inconsistent application of the Lemon
test in the preceding five cases has produced the counterintuitive
66
effect of prohibiting the posting of the Ten Commandments,
prohibiting meditation and prayer periods, 67 and prohibiting the

teaching of "creation science ' 68 in public schools, while allowing
state sponsored prayers before a state legislature 69 and state
70
sponsored displays clearly rooted in religious teachings.
C.

Subjective Motivation as a Judicial Standard

Due to its reliance on subjective intent 7 1 the "purpose"
prong is a difficult standard to apply as a basis for judicial

promote religion may be evidenced by the effect the act has on the promotion of religion
in general.).
61 In Edwards, Justice Brennan, in a footnote, stated that the Lemon test "has
been applied in all [establishment clause] cases since its adoption in 1971, except in
Marsh v. Chambers . . ." which he distinguished from cases involving public schools.
Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577 n.4.
Compare Valauri, supra note 42 (criticizing the "purpose" prong as too broad
so as to ban all forms of religious aid and all accommodation as well, and proposing
modifications) with Comment, Lemon Reconstituted, Justice O'Conner'sProposedModifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
465 (advocating Justice O'Conner's modification of the Lemon test as stated in her
concurring opinions in Lynch v. Donnelly and Wallace v. Jaffree).
63 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
' See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
"
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children,
but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the
private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.
Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577.
66 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.

61 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 49, 54-56 and accompanying text.
7, "Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated adoption of the
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inquiry. 72 In other contexts the Supreme Court has, in fact,

refused to use intent as a basis of decision.
In United States v. O'Brien,73 O'Brien was convicted of
wilfully destroying his draft card in violation of the Selective
Service Act. O'Brien argued that his actions were a form of
symbolic speech, protected under the first amendment, 74 and

that the law was unconstitutional because Congress' purpose in
passing the Act was to suppress free speech. 75 The Court, rejecting O'Brien's argument, refused to strike the statute solely
76
on the basis of an allegedly improper motive.

Chief Justice Warren cited three reasons for rejecting a judicial standard based on legislative motive. 77 First, speeches are
not reliable in determining the motives of a multi-member legislature. Second, a legislature could re-enact an invalidated law
at a later time for better reasons. Finally, he implied that motivebased invalidation of legislation could hamper effective lawmaking by allowing good laws with bad motives to be struck down.

In addition to Chief Justice Warren's well-taken considerations, an inherent psychological problem exists in divining an
individual's motivation in formulating legislation, or in divining
an individual's motivation in taking any objective action. A
judicial standard based on such motivation is unreliable, and,
therefore, inappropriate as a course of inquiry.

Act. 'The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion.' " Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting Lynch,
465 U.S. at 690 (O'Conner, J., concurring)).
12 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
- 391 U.S. 367 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382-83.
" Id. at 383; see NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969), reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969) (In the context of determining why an employee signed a
union authorization card, the Court rejected a proposed rule which required "a probe
of an employee's subjective motivation as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry.").
But see Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (Unable to produce a majority
opinion on the appropriate first amendment standards for book banning in public
schools, the Court, on a 5-4 vote, remanded the case for a determination of the motives
of the individual school board members.); Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 197
(1982) (For tax purposes, "intent is relevant in determining whether a gift has been
made.").
7' O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84.
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EDWARDS V. AGoULLARD AND THE FUTURE

In Edwards v. Aguillard,78 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reassess the Lemon test.79 The challenged Louisiana
statute,8 0 similar to the Arkansas statute' overturned in Mc-

Lean,8 2 required "balanced treatment" of "creation science"
and "evolution science '8 3 whenever the origins of life were

taught in public schools. The statute also prohibited discrimination by any school board, college board, or administrator
'8
against an instructor who chose to support "creation science.

4

The statute further provided for a publicly funded committee
composed only of "creation scientists" to develop the curricu-

lum.

It gave no similar protection or benefit to "evolution

107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876
(1971).
10LA. REV.

STAT.

AN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).

Alc. STAT. ANN. § 80-1663 to -1670 (Supp. 1985).
82 McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. at § 17:286.4.
"

84

The statute read in pertinent part:
A. Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools within

this state shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolutionscience. Balanced treatment of these two models shall be given in classroom
lectures taken as a whole for each course, in text-book materials taken as
a whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for the
sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other education
programs in public schools, to the extent that such lectures, textbooks,
library materials, or educational programs deal in any way with the subject
of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation or
evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven
scientific fact.
B. Public schools within this state and their personnel shall not
discriminate by reducing a grade of a student or by singling out and
publicly criticizing any student who demonstrates a satisfactory understanding of both evolution-science or creation-science and who accepts or rejects
either model in whole or part.
C. No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or instructor
in any state-supported university in Louisiana, who chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach scientific data which points to creationism shall,
for that reason, be discriminated against in any way by any school board,
college board, or administrator.
Id.
s
A. Each city and parish school board shall develop and provide to
each public school classroom teacher in the system a curriculum guide on
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scientists" or the evolution curriculum. 86
The Fifth Circuit invalidated the statute. 87 In affirming the
circuit court decision, the Supreme Court, by a plurality decision, 88 strictly applied the Lemon test. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he legislative history documents
that the Act's primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage
to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of

evolution in its entirety."' 89 He concluded that "[b]ecause the
primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the
First Amendment." 90

The effect of this decision, like those applying the "purpose"
prong before it, most likely will be the enactment of a similar
statute with slightly altered language and a sanitized record. 9'
The emphasis of the "purpose" prong on individual intent appears to present a test too difficult to apply.9 2 The sources which

reveal such intent can be "contrived and sanitized, favorable

presentation of creation-science.
B. The governor shall designate seven creation-scientists who shall
provide resource services in the development of curriculum guides to any
city or parish school board upon request. Each such creation-scientist shall
be designated from among the full-time faculty members teaching in any
college and university in Louisiana. These creation-scientists shall serve at
the pleasure of the governor and without compensation.
Id. at § 17:286.7.
Id. See supra notes 84-85.
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), affd, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987).
" The decision produced two concurring opinions, representing Justices Powell,
O'Conner and White, and a dissent, representing Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2584-2607.
Id. at 2582.
90Id. The dissent argues that the majority incorrectly looks to the primary purpose
of the legislation. Justice Scalia writes that the "Balanced Treatment" Act should be
invalidated by the majority under the "purpose" prong "only if the record indicates
that the Louisiana Legislature had no secular purpose." Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
91 See supra notes 11-41 and accompanying text.
91 Justice Scalia argues that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting
the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task." Edwards, 107 S. Ct.
2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1987-88]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS

1073

media coverage orchestrated, and post-enactment recollections
'93

conveniently distorted.
By abandoning the "purpose" prong the Court could address
the substantive issues targeted by the second and the third prongs
of the Lemon test. The second prong of the Lemon test requires

that an act's "principle or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." 94 The third prong prohibits acts fostering "an excessive government entanglement with

religion." 95 While these standards maintain a level of desired
flexibility, 96 they are sufficiently objective in nature and, there-

fore, judicially manageable. Application of the second and third
prongs alone should provide for more conclusive and consistent
97
results than has been achieved using the "purpose" prong.
Abandoning the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test would
present an opportunity for the Court to lay to rest the question

of religion in public schools. 9 If the Court finds "creation
science" to be a religious doctrine, all "balanced treatment"
statutes might be invalidated under prong two or prong three.
Legislation that advances a religion-by requiring its teaching in

public schools or by requiring public school boards to oversee
and to administer the new subject area-could be prohibited. 99

91

Id. at 2606.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
11Id. at 613.
" What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical
imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible
outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility,
but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction between
the courts and the states . . . produces a single, more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
97 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
" It is implicit in the Edwards dissent that the second and third prongs of the
Lemon test provide sufficient establishment clause protection even in the absense of the
"purpose" prong. Justice Scalia argues for the abandonment of the "purpose" prong
without suggesting any modification of the remainder of the Lemon test. Edwards, 107
S. Ct. at 2607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 These two tests provide a sufficient standard for establishment clause protection
in and of themselves. See supra note 98. The "secular effect" prong inquires into the
substantive nature of the challenged activity while the "entanglement" prong, which
deals with administrative realities, is more procedural in character.
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Conversely, if the Court finds "creation science" to be pre-

sentable as a secular subject,10 ° standard guidelines for states in
passing sufficiently secular legislation could be established. In
either case, the validity of the tenets of Creationism as a subject

of public school instruction could be resolved.
In what must be considered dicta, given the scope of the
decision, the Court has given some hints as to the nature of
"creation science." The Edwards plurality, 0 and both concur-

rences,' 0 2 indicate that "creation science" may historically and
inevitably be linked with religious doctrine. The dissent implicitly
indicates the possibility of a secular "balanced treatment" statute. 103 The recent appointment of Justice Kennedy to the Court
may alter this equation. Under the present state of the law,
however, if the "purpose" prong is violated, the Court need not
apply the second or third prongs.' 4
CONCLUSION

Application of the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test 05 to
invalidate state creationist legislation fails to resolve the issue of

100See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87
L.J. 515, 556-57 (1978) (arguing that scientific creationism is presentable as a
secular subject).
embodies a particular religious
101Justice Brennan writes that "creation-science ...
tenet." Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582.
- Justice White writes that "[b]ased on the historical setting and plain language
of the act both courts [below] construed the statutory words 'creation-science' to refer
to a religious belief....
We usually defer to the Court of Appeals on the meaning of a state statute ......
Id. at 2590-91 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Powell argues that "concepts concerning God or a supreme being of some
sort are manifestly religious.... These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely
because they are presented as a philosophy or as a science." Id. at 2585 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per
curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
103 In the context of a motion for summary judgment, Justice Scalia writes: "At
this point, then, we must assume that the Balanced Treatment Act does not require the
presentation of religious doctrine." Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"1 "If the law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, 'no consideration
of the second or third criteria [of Lemon] is necessary.' " Id. at 2578 (quoting Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
os Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876
(1971).
YALE
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"creation science" and "evolution science" instruction in public
schools.01 It also creates inconsistent results and confusing precedents.10 7 The Court has adopted the "flexible" guidelines of

the Lemon test at the expense of clarity and predictability 10s
The need for flexibility, however, cannot override the need for

a manageable judicial standard.
The simplest, and perhaps the most appropriate, solution is
to abandon the "purpose" prong altogether 109 This alteration
of the Lemon test would allow the Court to reach the substantive
questions regarding "balanced treatment" statutes and thereby

provide a more objective and consistent analysis for deciding
establishment clause cases. As Justice Scalia writes: "I think it
time that we sacrifice some 'flexibility' for 'clarity and predictability ' Abandoning Lemon's purpose test
would be a good
place to start."110
Jeffrey S. Theuer

See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
116See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). See generally
Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REv
127 (1985) (general discussion of the importance of maintaining flexible standard in
adjudicating establishment clause claims).
119Justice O'Conner has proposed a modification of the "purpose" and "secular
effect" prongs. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S: 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Conner, J.,
concurring). Under this analysis, the new prongs would ask (1) whether the government
intends the statute to convey a message of endorsement of religion or disapproval of
religion and (2) whether the statute actually conveys such a message. Id. at 691-92
(O'Conner, J., concurring). See generally Comment, supra note 62 (favorably examining
O'Conner's proposed modification). This proposed modification, however, still leaves
the problem of determining subjective intent. Justice O'Conner's first prong would
require the same type of analysis of individual motive as the "purpose" prong presently
requires. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91 (O'Conner, J., concumng).
1o Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2607 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"0
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